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Abstract 
 
Empirical evidence suggests that there has been a divergence over time in 
income distributions across countries and within countries.  Furthermore, 
developing economies show a great deal of diversity in their growth patterns 
during the process of economic development.  For example, some of these 
countries converge rapidly on the leaders, while others stagnate, or even 
experience reversals and declines in their growth processes.  In this paper we 
study a simple dynamic general equilibrium model with household specific costs 
of technology adoption which is consistent with these stylized facts.  In our 
model, growth is endogenous, and there are two-period lived overlapping 
generations of agents, assumed to be heterogeneous in their initial holdings of 
wealth and capital.  We find that in a special case of our model, with costs 
associated with the adoption of more productive technologies fixed across 
households, inequalities in wealth and income may increase over time, tending 
to delay the convergence in international income differences.  The model is also 
capable of explaining some of the observed diversity in the growth pattern of 
transitional economies.  According to the model, this diversity may be the result 
of variability in adoption costs over time, or the relative position of a transitional 
economy in the world income distribution.  In the more general case of the 
model with household specific adoption costs, negative growth rates during the 
transitional process are also possible. 
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1. Introduction 
Empirical evidence suggests that there has been a divergence over time in 
income distributions across countries and within countries.  For example, based 
on the work of Quah (1996, 1997), there is strong evidence to suggest an 
emergence of “twin-peaks” in cross-sectional world income distributions.  There 
is also substantial evidence to suggest that this type of polarization is present in 
income distributions within countries. (See, for example, Sala-i-Martin 2006, 
Jappelli and Pistaferri 2000, Piketty and Saez 2003, and Schluter 1998, among 
others).  Typically the empirics of economic growth support Baumol’s (1986) 
idea of “convergence clubs” emerging across and within countries.   
   Furthermore, Pritchett (1997) suggests that the growth patterns of countries 
that fall into the “developing economies” category exhibit a great deal of 
diversity.   For example, some of these countries converge rapidly on the 
leaders, while others stagnate, or even experience reversals and declines in their 
growth processes.  Pritchett cites the experience of Mozambique (-2.2 percent 
per annum), and Guyana (-0.7 percent per annum), as examples from a group of 
16 developing economies which experienced negative growth rates in the period 
1960 – 1992. 
   There is a large theoretical and empirical literature that seeks to explain cross 
country income differences. (For a collection of representative literature see 
Acemoglu 2004a, 2004b.)  An interesting strand within this literature looks at 
the implications of technology adoption and the consequent structural change 
associated with the process of growth and development.  Recent efforts in this 
direction, (e.g., Hansen and Prescott, 2002, Ngai, 2004, Parente and Prescott, 
2004), suggest barriers to adopting more productive technologies as an 
explanation for cross-country income differences.  There are studies that also 
suggest that inequalities in initial income distributions have a bearing on the 
issue of technology adoption.  For example, in the work of Horii et al.(2005) 
credit market imperfections, in conjunction with inequality prevents the 
adoption of more capital intensive technologies.  In a model with an exogenous, 
fixed cost of adopting technology, Khan and Ravikumar (2002), show that 
income inequality within a country increases over time.   
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   The model of this paper is similar in sprit to the literature on technology 
adoption discussed above.  In particular, the model has features in common with 
the framework used in Khan and Ravikumar (2002) in that it uses an “AK” 
specification for technologies used, and has a fixed cost associated with 
adopting more productive technologies.  However, in contrast to their model, we 
use a two-period overlapping generations structure, which means that while a 
generation is faced with a one-time cost of adoption, the dynasty to which the 
household belongs faces the adoption decision in each time period.  
Furthermore, we allow for variability in adoption costs across households and 
over time. 
   As in Khan and Ravikumar, in our model there is a threshold level of capital 
for which the households in the economy switch to the more productive 
technology.  The threshold level of capital depends on the parameters of 
technology, and is monotonically declining in the level of wealth of the 
household, a feature that is consistent with empirical evidence. (See for 
example, Wozniak 1987, Alauddin and Tisdell, 1991).   Furthermore, unlike 
Khan and Ravikumar this threshold also depends on preference parameters. For 
example the degree of altruism seems to matter in our model. More altruistic 
households are likely to adopt the better technology sooner and quicker adoption 
reduces post-transitional inequality. 
    We first consider a special case of the model in which adoption costs do not 
vary across households but are allowed to vary over time in some of our 
numerical experiments. We find that assumptions about the initial distribution 
can have very different implications for the date in which all households in the 
economy adopt the better technology.  Inequality can therefore increase and 
remain persistent for very long periods of time, consequently delaying the 
process of structural transformation that is associated with development.   
   Furthermore, this feature also has significant implications for divergence in 
incomes across countries. It appears that higher degree of altruism enables 
complete adoption to take place sooner as more altruistic households leave 
larger bequests for the next generation. Post transitional inequality is then 
decreasing in the degree of altruism, as poorer households tend to leave a larger 
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proportion of their income in the form of bequest. This feature of our model is 
consitent with the findings of Tomes (1981). 
   Also, as mentioned above, we conduct some thought experiments which allow 
some variability in the fixed cost of adoption across different time periods.  Our 
experiments indicate that either variable or increasing adoption costs delay the 
process of transition to higher growth rates.  Variability in adoption costs also 
has the effect of producing “reversals” in the growth process, a characteristic 
that has been observed in the case of several developing economies.  However, 
these reversals are not characterized by negative growth rates – a feature that has 
characterized the growth experience of some developing economies. (See for 
example Pritchett 1997). 
  An interesting feature of the model revealed by our experiments is the diversity 
of growth patterns observed for different cohorts of households in the economy.   
Household dynasties positioned at the “rich”, “poor”, or median levels of the 
income distribution are all capable of experiencing reversals in the growth of 
income over time.  The timing of these reversals, which are temporary, appears 
to be related to the timing of technology adoption, which is, of course, different 
across various income groups. 
  Next, we consider the more general case of the model in which adoption costs 
are household specific.  That is, we allow for adoption costs that vary randomly 
across households and over time.  Our results do not significantly differ from the 
previous case of fixed adoption costs.  However an appealing feature of the 
general case of our model is capable of producing negative growth rates during 
the transition process.  As noted earlier, reversals in the form of negative growth 
rates is one of the aspects that characterizes the diversity of experiences with the 
group Pritchett (1997) refers to as “developing economies”. 
   In the section that follows we describe the economic environment.  Section 3 
presents the results based on various numerical simulations of this model.  
Section 4 concludes. 
2. The economic environment 
The economy consists of two-period lived overlapping generations of agents 
who are heterogeneous in their holdings of wealth and capital, and have perfect 
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foresight.  Time is discrete, with t = 0, 1, 2, …, and we assume that the initial 
distributions of capital and wealth are described by F( . ), and G( . ) respectively.  
There are N agents in the economy, and preferences of ith agent born in period t 
are described as follows: 
   )1().ln()ln()ln(),,( 1111 ++++ ++= itititititit WCCWCCU βθβ  
Here,  itC  and 1+itC denote the agents’ consumption in the first and second 
period of life, 1+itW represents bequests left to the next generation.  In order to 
produce output individuals have to decide on adoption of one of two 
technologies, which will be henceforth referred to as Technology A and 
Technology B.  Technology A is associated with lower productivity but does not 
involve any adoption costs.  It is given by  
                                                it
A
it AKY = ,  
where itK  represents the period t composite human and physical capital stock 
held by ith old agent and supplied to the young for production.  However given 
that our model has “AK” structure, the nature of this variable has to be 
interpreted carefully. One can think of itK  as an “operational bequest” from the 
older generation to the young generation. We can, for example, think itK  as 
including physical capital stock in the form of a family owned factory and also 
including human capital stock in the form of the education and know-how 
associated with the existing technology.  When agents are young they spend 
1+itK  which can be interpreted as the amount paid for the physical capital stock 
plus training and education required to operate the technology for the next 
period’s young generation. In that sense it may perhaps be more appropriate to 
interpret each household in our model as a “country” or a “region”.  
   Technology B is more productive than Technology A, but involves a cost of 
adoption.  It is therefore characterized by  
.0,, >>−= ititit
B
it ABBKY δδ                 
where itδ  represents household specific cost of adopting Technology B. Here 
itδ represents the household specific adoption cost experienced in period t.  We 
assume that this cost is a stochastic shock that is observed by the household 
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prior to making the technology adoption decision.  In the subsequent sections of 
this paper we also consider a special case of the model in which the adoption 
cost is a fixed, economy-wide cost ( itδ =δ ) rather than a household specific 
variable cost.  As in Khan and Ravikumar (2002), we interpret δ  in our model 
as the present value of “learning by doing” costs associated with the more 
productive technology.  
   Households adopting Technology A face the following budget constraints: 
            )2(1 ititAitAit WAKKC +=+ +  
)3()1( 1111 AitAitAtAit WKrC ++++ −+=  
   Households adopting Technology B, on the other hand, face the constraints:    
)4(1 itititBitBit WBKKC +−=+ + δ  
)5(.)1( 1111 BitBitBtBit WKrC ++++ −+=  
   In the equations above Atr 1+  and 
B
tr 1+  refer to the rate of return on capital 
enjoyed by agents who had adopted technologies A and B respectively when 
they were young.  The superscripts A and B applied to the other variables have 
an analogous interpretation.  Note that the “AK” structure of production 
functions we have assumed here is typically known to generate non- 
convergence in incomes across countries.  See for example Mankiw, Romer, and 
Weil, (1992) and references therein.  
   Note also that the model here has a structure similar to that of Khan and Ravikumar 
(2002), but with the key difference that we allow for household specific adoption costs, 
and a two-period overlapping-generations structure has been assumed.  Khan and 
Ravikumar consider an infinite horizon model with non-overlapping generations and a 
one-time adoption cost, after which the old technology is never used.   In our model, 
each generation faces a technology adoption problem, even if the previous generation 
belonging to the same cohort had adopted the B technology. 
  Furthermore, we have an additional state variable in the form of bequests itW  
left over from the previous generation, which can also cause inequalities to 
persist over time. 
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   Agents using technology A maximize (1) subject to (2) and (3).  The implied 
optimal plans for consumption, capital accumulation and bequests are: 
        [ ] )6())1(1(
1
itit
A
it WAKC +++
=
θβ  
       [ ] )7())1(1(
)1( 1
1 itit
A
tA
it WAK
rC +
++
+
=
+
+ θβ
β
 
        [ ] )8())1(1(
)1( 1
1 itit
A
tA
it WAK
rW +
++
+
=
+
+ θβ
θβ
 
           [ ] )9(.))1(1(
)1(
1 itit
A
it WAKK +++
+
=+ θβ
θβ
 
   Likewise we can show that agents who adopt B will have: 
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   It is clear that ith agent will adopt technology B iff 
                     ),,(),,( 11 AtititABtititB rWKUrWKU ++ ≥    
   Where AU  and BU  represent the indirect utility functions for agents adopting 
the A and B technologies respectively.  It is then easy to show that this implies 
the following: 
Proposition 1: Let ,)1(*
AB
W
K ititit λ
λδ
−
−−
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)1(1
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A
.  For a 
given level of wealth itW  a household will adopt technology B iff *itit KK ≥ . 
 
   The above proposition defines a threshold level of capital required for a 
household with wealth itW  to find it worthwhile to adopt the more productive 
technology B.  Alternatively we could have defined a threshold level of wealth 
needed to adopt the B technology for a given level of capital stock.  The 
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equations of Proposition 1 in fact define a “adoption-possibilities frontier” 
represented by a locus of combinations of wealth and capital that make the 
switch to technology B possible.  As illustrated by Figure 1, this frontier shifts 
to the right in (K, W) space as the cost of adoption δ increases.  Since 1<λ , 
higher levels of wealth are associated with lower levels of the threshold capital 
stock.  The frontier is therefore downward sloping. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Critical combinations of initial wealth and capital for different levels 
of adoption costs. 
 
   Furthermore, the frontier also depends on preference parameters. Interestingly, 
a higher value for the altruism parameter (θ) causes a downward shift in the 
frontier.  Intuitively, a more altruistic household is likely to adopt sooner, as this 
makes it possible to leave larger bequests to the next generation. This has 
important implications for the dynamics of the model and the evolution of 
inequality over time, as will be illustrated by some of the numerical experiments 
conducted in the subsequent section. 
δ=20 
δ=15 
 9 
 
Figure 2: Critical combinations of initial wealth and capital for different levels 
of altruism parameter (θ). 
   The dynamics of this model are described by the following system of first 
order difference equations 
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where  ,)1(*
AB
W
K ititit λ
λδ
−
−−
=  with λ  defined as in Proposition 1.  Note that the 
threshold level of capital varies over time, and across households, which makes 
it difficult to characterize the dynamics of the system analytically.   
   In what follows, we report results of various numerical experiments that 
involve varying some of the parameters of the model and the initial distributions 
of capital and wealth.  We focus our attention on the consequences of these 
experiments for the date of transition to higher growth rates, and the evolution 
of inequality within the economy over time.  An obvious by-product of these 
 10 
experiments is the implication for cross-country income differences and 
inequality in the world income distribution.  We also examine the pattern of 
growth rates of various aggregates such as savings, per capita output, 
consumption and bequests over time.  These patterns show a significant amount 
of diversity across different cohorts of households.  We therefore also report 
these patterns for households that are in the lowest 20%, the highest 20%, and 
the mean and median positions in the income distribution. 
 
3. Results of quantitative experiments 
   In sub-section 3.1 below we examine the special cases in which (i) the 
adoption cost is fixed across households and over time ( itδ ≡δ ), and (ii) the 
adoption cost is fixed across households but allowed to vary over time ( itδ ≡ tδ ).  
In sub-section 3.2 we examine the more general model with household specific 
adoption costs. 
 
3.1: Adoption Costs Fixed Across Households  
   We first examine the implications for the transition process of the economy 
towards the adoption of Technology B.  The combination of parameters is 
represented in Table 1 below: 
   The total number of household in the sample is 5011.  In Figure 3 we report 
how the number of households adopting Technology A, and the number 
adopting Technology B, evolve over time.  For example the number of 
households adopting Technology B is represented by the increasing sequence of 
2, 32, 129, 287, 420, 478, 495, and 501.  The initial distributions of capital and 
wealth are assumed to be lognormal with mean 3.6 and variance 1.2, with the 
adoption cost parameter 20≡≡ δδ it .  In Figure 3 it is clear that all households 
adopt technology at date 8* =T .  Note that our model has a two-period 
overlapping-generations structure in which a single period is interpreted as 
approximately 35 years. (See for example Hansen and Prescott, 2002).  
                                                 
1
 Results do not change qualitatively for larger samples – i.e. the date at which all households 
adopt B seems to be invariant to the number of households in the initial distribution.  Note that 
since we do not have population growth in this model, the total number of households remains 
constant over time. 
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Effectively, therefore, this means that the households completely adopt 
Technology B in 280 years. 
 
 
Figure 3: Number of households adopting Technology A or B in different time 
periods. 
 
3.1.1  Experiments with the adoption-cost parameter δ   
   In Figure 3 we examine the effect of increasing the fixed cost of adoption on 
the date at which all households shift to using Technology B. We consider 
values of δ  set equal to 20, 25, 30, 35.  As illustrated in the Figure the 
corresponding dates of transition *T  are equal to 8, 9, 10, 14 respectively.  In 
terms of our model this implies complete adoption after 280, 315, 350, and 490 
years respectively.  Higher adoption costs are interpreted to be the result of 
institutional or structural features that have not been explicitly modeled here.  
However, the implication for cross country differences in income is obvious.  
Furthermore, another implication for countries facing high adoption cost 
pertains to the level of inequality in the income distribution after the transition 
takes place.  For example in Figure 4 we examine the Gini coefficients of capital 
and wealth over time for different adoption costs.  It appears that the level of 
inequality of the post-transition capital and wealth distributions does not vary 
significantly as adoption costs increase. 
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Figure 4 (a): Number of households adopting Technology A or B in different 
time periods with varying adoption costs. 
 
 
Figure 4 (b): Gini coefficients of capital and wealth over time for different 
adoption costs. 
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  The results above motivate some simple thought experiments.  That is, based 
on the impact of the magnitude of adoption costs on transition dates and 
inequality levels eventually attained, it is of interest to examine the effect of (a) 
adoption costs that vary randomly over time, and (b) adoption costs that 
increase over time.  These experiments are further motivated by the idea that the 
growth experience of transitional economies in cross-country data exhibits a lot 
of diversity.  Pritchett (1997) suggests that while some countries that fall in the 
category of “developing economies” have experienced rapid growth and 
convergence to higher income levels, others have experienced an interruption of 
the growth process manifested in the form of stagnation or even reversals.   
   In Figure 5(a) we examine the impact of adoption costs that vary randomly 
over time.  We constructed the adoption cost series by using a uniform random 
number generator with a transformation that generated positive values of δ  
between 10 and 60.  We find that although there are some reversals in the 
adoption process during the transition period, eventually complete adoption 
takes place.  The variability of adoption costs appear to impact significantly on 
the date of eventual transformation.  The experiment therefore indicates that 
varying adoption costs may be a potential candidate for explaining reversals in 
growth process that has been experienced by some developing economies.  Note 
that we assume that there is no uncertainty associated with the household’s 
technology adoption decision – the decision to adopt a particular technology is 
taken after the cost is observed by the household.  An interesting extension of 
the model would entail considering a “risky” technology adoption decision 
whereby the costs are observed after the adoption decision takes place, and only 
the distribution of adoption costs is known. 
   In Figure 5(b) we look at increases in adoption costs over time.  We consider 
experiments in which adoption costs grow at a rate of 10%, 15%, and 20% over 
time, starting at a minimum value of 20.  Again, we emphasize that this is 
simply a thought experiment based on a somewhat “ad-hoc” process for 
adoption costs.  Ideally, the variability in adoption costs should be modeled as a 
process that is endogenous in the sense that it arises due to some institutional or 
structural features characteristic of developing economies, and that is explicitly 
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Figure 5(a): Impact of variability in adoption costs over time. 
 
Figure 5(b): Impact of increases in adoption costs over time. 
 
 
modeled into the framework.  However, our purpose here is simply to explore 
whether this may be fruitful direction of research.  To that end, the results 
reported in Figure 5(b) appear to support the idea that this may indeed be the 
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case.  Increasing adoption costs appear to significantly delay the process of 
complete adoption.  For example corresponding to the adoption-cost growth 
rates mentioned above the transition to Technology B takes place approximately 
after 420, 455, and 525 years respectively. 
 
3.1.2. Experiments that vary initial inequality levels 
   Next we consider the implications for varying levels of inequality in the initial 
distributions of wealth and capital, on the date of transition and eventual 
inequality levels.  Figure 6 reports four panels which correspond to four 
different initial distributions that are essentially mean-preserving spreads of the 
distribution corresponding to Figure 1.  That is the mean of all of the initial 
distributions is 3.5 with variances given by 1.01, 2.01, 2.80, 3.65 respectively.  
(The corresponding Gini coefficients of the initial distribution of wealth are: 
0.1586, 0.2149, 0.2371, and 0.2741 respectively).  In this figure we consider the 
impact on inequality levels in the post-transitional distributions of wealth and 
capital.  Here, we find that higher levels of initial inequality translate into higher 
levels of post-transitional inequality. 
 
 
Figure 6: Gini coefficients of wealth and capital in different time periods with 
varying levels of initial inequality. 
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  The results corresponding to Figures 6 has an interesting implication for future 
directions of research.  Since the process of transition has such stark 
distributional implications political economy issues cannot be ignored.  It is for 
example, reasonable to argue that social and political conflict may ensue in the 
process of transition leading to an interruption of the process.  This issue is 
addressed, for example, in Krusell and Rios-Rull (1996). 
 
3.1.3: Growth patterns across different cohorts in the income distribution 
Figure 7 examines the patterns in the evolution of output over time across 
different groups of household. This figure looks at the rate of growth of output 
for the median, richest 20% and poorest 20% of the households of the income 
distribution. (This experiment was also conducted for three other economic 
aggregates viz: wealth, savings and consumption).2 The striking aspect here is 
that the growth pattern for different cohorts of households is very diverse.  For 
example the timing of complete adoption and the timing of reversals and 
upswings in the growth process vary significantly across different groups.  
Furthermore, in some cases the pattern of growth is monotonic, while it is non-
monotonic for others. One may in fact infer that this characteristic would also 
translate into a corresponding diversity in the experiences of countries that are 
in different positions in the world distribution of income.  This feature of the 
model suggests that multi-country extension of this model similar in spirit to the 
framework considered in Basu and Weil (1998) with different income 
distributions across countries and a sequence of technologies with varying levels 
of productivity might yield a diversity of patterns that have been observed in the 
data. 
                                                 
2
 We do not present the results here, but they are available upon request. 
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Figure 7:  Growth rates experienced by the various cohorts of households 
 
 
3.1.4: Experiments with theta 
Consider Figures 8(a) and 8(b).  The results of these experiments are briefly 
summarized as follows: 
(i) Complete adoption to the more productive technology is faster for 
higher values of theta.  This follows in part from the fact the 
threshold level of capital that facilitates adoption is decreasing in 
theta.  When adoption costs are fixed, a more altruistic household is 
likely to adopt sooner as it enables the household to leave larger 
bequests for the next generation.  Typically, prior to adoption of the 
more productive technology a household leaves a higher proportion 
of their income in the form of bequests. (See figure 8(b).  In Figure 
8(b)  we present a transitional period in which all households have 
not yet adopted technology B for two cases: theta=1 and theta=1.5  
Bequests as a proportion of income is higher in the case of theta = 
1.5. Eventually after complete adoption the percentage of bequests 
left is constant, and lower in the case of theta =1  This feature of the 
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model is consistent with empirical evidence.  Based on panel data 
consisting of 659 estates in Ohio, U.S.A., Tomes (1981) finds that 
inheritance received from parents is inversely related to children’s 
income.3   
 
(ii)  Post transitional inequality is lower for higher values of theta.  
Intuitively, quicker adoption to technology B reduces post-
transitional inequality (See figure 8 (c)).  
 
 
Figure 8 (a): Number of households adopting Technology A or B in different 
time periods with varying levels of altruism parameter (θ). 
                                                 
3
 Please see Owen and Weil (1997) and Borjas (1992) for further discussion. 
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Figure 8 (b): Bequests as a proportion of income during transition and at steady 
state for different altruism parameter (θ).  
 
Figure 8 (c): Gini coefficients of capital and wealth over time for different 
altruism parameter (θ). 
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3.2: Household Specific Adoption Costs 
   We now consider the more general case of our model in which the adoption 
cost is a household specific stochastic shock, observed prior to the technology 
adoption decision. The values for the adoption cost parameter are drawn from 
shifted uniform distributions with varying means, keeping the variance constant. 
 
3.2.1  Experiments with the adoption-cost parameter δ   
Figure 9 reports the evolution of number of households adopting Technology A 
and B over time, for different average levels of the stochastic adoption cost 
parameter.  Our results mostly follow the same interpretation in the special case 
of our model described previously.  Unlike in the special case, one striking 
feature here, as illustrated by figure 9 is reversals and upswings in the adoption 
process.  As a result, with household specific adoption cost, complete adoption 
of the better technology is impossible and the economy uses both technologies 
at any given time period.   Furthermore this feature of the model suggests that 
the inequality in wealth and capital remains persistent.   
 
 
Figure 9: Number of households adopting Technology A or B in different time 
periods with varying adoption costs. 
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3.2.2. Experiments that vary initial inequality levels 
   Now we consider the implications for varying levels of inequality in the initial 
distributions of wealth and capital, on the date of transition and eventual 
inequality levels as we did in the special case our model.  In this experiment 
also, we find reversals and upswings in the adoption process. According to our 
results, it appears that, even with and very low levels of initial inequality, 
complete adoption of the better technology never takes place and the inequality 
remain persistent. We do not present our results here, but they are available 
upon request. 
 
3.2.3: Growth patterns across different cohorts in the income distribution 
   In our next experiment, we explore the pattern of growth rates in output, 
wealth, savings, and consumption in the economy with household specific 
adoption costs. Again our results exhibit diverse patterns of growth in these 
variables.  Interestingly, in contrast to the model of the section 3.1.3, the more 
general model with household specific adoption costs is capable of producing 
negative growth rates during the transition process. (See figure 11). This 
illustrates the potential of our model in terms of its capability to capture the 
diversity of growth patterns across economies that we referred to earlier.   
 
Figure 11:  Rates of growth experienced by rich and poor cohorts of 
households. 
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3.2.4: Experiments with theta 
   In our last experiment of this exercise, we examine the implications for the 
varying levels of altruism parameter with household specific stochastic shock in 
adoption costs, on the transition process of the economy. Our results do not 
differ significantly from the results we presented in section 3.2.1.4 In this 
experiment also, it appears that, complete adoption to the better technology 
never takes place, even with more altruistic households in the economy. As a 
result, the inequality in the economy remains persistent.  
 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
   Empirical evidence suggests that there has been a divergence over time in 
income distributions across countries and within countries.  In this paper we 
study a simple dynamic general equilibrium model of technology adoption 
which is consistent with these stylized facts.  In our model, growth is 
endogenous, and agents are assumed to be heterogeneous in their initial holdings 
of wealth and capital.  We find that in the presence of barriers or costs 
associated with the adoption of more productive technologies, inequalities in 
wealth and income may increase over time tending to delay the convergence in 
international income differences.  The model is also capable of explaining the 
observed diversity in the growth pattern of transitional economies.  According to 
the model, this diversity may be the result of variability in adoption costs, or the 
relative position of a transitional economy in the world income distribution. 
   Some of our quantitative experiments suggest some interesting directions for 
future research.  Ideally, the variability in adoption costs should be modeled as a 
process that is endogenous in the sense that it arises due to some institutional or 
structural features characteristic of developing economies, and that is explicitly 
modeled into the framework.  Furthermore, the inequalities that result from the 
process of transition indicate that political economy issues would also have a 
bearing on these issues.  Risks associated with the variability of adoption costs 
may also be of importance.  
 
                                                 
4
 Therefore we do not show our results here, but they are available upon request.   
 23 
References. 
 
Acemoglu D. (2004 a). Recent developments on growth theory. Volume I. Edward 
Elgar Publishing Limited. 
 
Acemoglu D. (2004 b). Recent developments on growth theory. Volume II. Edward 
Elgar Publishing Limited. 
 
Alauddin M. and Tisdel C. (1991). The “green revolution’ and labour absorption in 
Bangladesh agriculture: The relevance of the east Asian experience.  Pakistan 
Development Review, Vol 30 (2) 173-188. 
 
Basu S. and Weil D.N.  (1998). Appropriate technology and growth. Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, Vol 113 (4) 1025-1054. 
Baumol S. (1986), Productivity growth convergence and welfare, what long term data 
show?  The American Economic Review, Vol. 76 (5) 
Borjas G.J. (1992). Ethnic Capital and intergenerational mobility. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol 108 619-652 . 
Hansen G. and Prescott E. (2002). Malthus to Solow. American Economic Review, Vol 
92  1205-17. 
Horii R., Ohdoi R. and Yamamoto K. (2005). Finance, technology and inequality in 
economic development. Discussion papers in economics and development, Graduate 
school of economics and Osaka school of international public policy. 
 
Jappelli T. and  Pistaferri L. (2000) .The dynamics of household wealth accumulation in 
Italy. Fiscal Studies, Vol 21 (2) 269-295. 
 
Khan A. and Ravikumar B (2002). Costly technology adoption and capital 
accumulation. Review of Economic Dynamics Vol 5, 489-502. 
 
Krusell P. and Rios-Rull J. (1996). Vested interests in a positive theory of stagnation 
and growth. Review of Economic Studies, Vol 63 (2) 301-329.  
 
Mankiw N.G., Romer D. and Weil D.N. (1992). A contribution to the empirics of 
economic growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol 107 (2) 407-437. 
 
Ngai, R. (2004). Barriers and the transition to modern growth. Journal of Monetary 
Economics, Vol 51 (7) 1353-1383. 
Owen A.L. and Weil D.N. (1997) Intergenerational earnings mobility, inequality and 
growth. National Bureau of Economic Research, Working paper 6070 
Parente S. and Prescott E. (2004). A unified theory of the evolution of international 
income levels. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Research Department Staff 
Report 333. 
Piketty T. and Saez E. (2003). Income inequality in the United States. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, Vol 118 (1) 1-39. 
 24 
 
Pritchett L. (1997). Divergence, Big Time. Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol 11 
(3) 3-17.  
 
Quah D. (1996). Empirics for economic growth and convergence. European Economic 
Review, Vol 40 (6) 1353-1375. 
Quah D. (1997). Empirics for economic growth and distribution. Journal of Economic 
Growth, Vol 2 (1) 27-59. 
Schluter C. (1998). Income dynamics in Germany, the USA and the UK: Evidence from 
panel data, Centre for analysis of social exclusion –CASE papers. 
 
Tomes N. (1981). The family, inheritance and intergenerational transmission of 
inequality. The Journal of Political Economy, Vol 89 (5) 928-957 
 
Wozniak G.D. (1987) Human capital, information and the early adoption of new 
technology. Journal of Human Resources, Vol  22 (1) 101-112. 
 
Xala-i- Martin X. (2006) The world distribution of income: falling poverty and … 
convergence, period. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol 121 (2) 351-397 
